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Introduction 
In 1999, President Clinton called racial profiling "morally 
indefensible."1  Ten years later, President Obama said it is a problem that 
"stills haunts us" as an American society.2  After President Obama 
commented on the incident between Sergeant James Crowley and Professor 
Henry Louis Professor Gates, a discussion regarding racial profiling in 
America invoked national attention.3  Although President Obama did not 
specifically use the term "racial profiling," his remarks were generally 
understood as alluding to racial profiling because of his reference to the fact 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1999, at A2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1999/06/10/us/clinton-orders-investigation-on-possible-racial-profiling.html 
("Declaring racial profiling ‘morally indefensible,’ President Clinton today ordered Federal 
law-enforcement agencies to compile data on the race and ethnicity of people they question, 
search or arrest to determine whether suspects are stopped because of the color of their 
skin."). 
 2. See Krissah Thompson, Obama Addresses Race and Louis Gates Incident, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/22/AR2009072203800.html ("President Obama said Wednesday 
night that race still haunts America, even as he noted ‘the incredible progress that has been 
made.’"). 
 3. See Helene Cooper, Obama Criticizes Arrest of Harvard Professor, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2009, at A20, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/ 
23gates.html ("‘There’s a long history in this country of African-Americans being stopped 
disproportionately by the police,’ Mr. Obama said.")  "It’s a sign of how race remains a 
factor in this society."  Id.  When speaking of the incident involving Professor Gates, 
President Obama initially said: 
No. 1, any of us would have been pretty angry; No. 2, that the Cambridge police 
acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there was already proof that they 
were in their own home; and No. 3, what I think we know separate and apart 
from this incident is there is a long history in this country of African-Americans 
and Latinos being stopped by police disproportionately.  That’s just a fact.  Id.
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that minorities were disproportionately stopped when compared to whites.4
Statistics show that within the criminal justice system, the disproportionate 
rate at which minorities are arrested and prosecuted plays a pivotal role in 
making racial profiling an issue.5  A variety of studies reveals that members 
of racial minority groups, in particular Blacks and Hispanics, could be 
overexposed to harmful action from beginning to end in the American 
criminal justice system.6  One commentator concluded that President 
Obama all but blamed the police department for racial profiling in the 
Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley eruption;7 however, President 
Obama’s statements implicitly suggest that Hispanics and African 
Americans are quite familiar with the act of racial profiling by law 
enforcement officers.8  President Obama is also on record as suggesting that 
both Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley may have "overreacted."9
I.  Police Investigate Apparent Break-In at Professor Gates’ Home 
On July 16, 2009, Lucia Whalen, a white woman, placed a call to the 
police reporting that two men appeared to be breaking into a house in her 
neighborhood.10  Cambridge police officers were dispatched to the scene to 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See id. and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s remarks about the 
racial incident involving Professor Gates). 
 5. See David Gillborn, Risk-Free Racism:  Whiteness and So-Called "Free Speech,"
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 537–39 (2009) (discussing the disproportionate arrests and 
prosecutions of minorities, particularly African Americans, in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom). 
 6. See id. at 539 ("[T]he [United States] government has also acknowledged that 
‘various studies indicate that members of minorities (especially Blacks and Hispanics) may 
be disproportionately subject to adverse treatment throughout the criminal justice process.’" 
(citing Amnesty Int’l, Racism and the Administration of Justice, AI Index AFR 40/020/2001, 
July 23, 2001)). 
 7. See Cooper, supra note 3, at A20 ("President Obama bluntly accused the police of 
acting ‘stupidly’ in arresting the Harvard scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. last week after an 
officer had established that Mr. Gates had not broken into his own home in Cambridge, 
Mass."). 
 8. See id. ("[President Obama] added that African-Americans and Hispanics in the 
United States have long been familiar with racial profiling by law enforcement."). 
 9. See Michael A. Fletcher & Michael D. Shear, Obama Voices Regret to Policeman:  
He Moves to Dampen Racial Controversy, WASH. POST, June 25, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072400451.html 
("The president said he continues to think the arrest was an ‘overreaction’ by the officer, but 
he said Gates ‘probably overreacted as well.’"). 
 10. See Robert Z. Nemeth, A Moment Not Teachable, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE (MA), Aug. 9, 2009, at A12 (stating that "Lucia Whalen, a concerned 
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investigate the possible break-in.11  During the investigation Sergeant James 
Crowley approached the door of Professor Gates’ home and asked him to 
step outside after informing Professor Gates, a black male, that he was at 
the residence to investigate a crime.12  In the police report filed by Sergeant 
Crowley, he stated that once he arrived at the home, he asked Professor 
Gates to step out on the porch and speak to him, to which Professor Gates 
replied, "No I will not."13  According to the police report, Professor Gates 
demanded to know who Sergeant Crowley was and why he was on his 
property.14  While Sergeant Crowley explained to Professor Gates that he 
was there to "investigat[e] a report of a break in,"15 Professor Gates opened 
the door and accused Officer Sergeant Crowley of being there because he 
was a "[B]lack man in America."16
After Sergeant Crowley entered into Professor Gates’ residence, he 
requested identification from Professor Gates to assist him in his 
investigation of the alleged break-in.17 Sergeant Crowley stated that he was 
very surprised and confused by the attitude Professor Gates exhibited 
towards him.18  Apparently, because of Sergeant Crowley’s surprise 
regarding Professor Gates attitude towards him, Sergeant Crowley asked 
                                                                                                                 
citizen . . . alerted police of a possible break-in"). 
 11. See Sally Kalson, Looking to Impart a Lesson; Obama, Professor, Officer Get 
Together for ‘Teachable Moment,’ PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 30, 2009, at A1 
(stating that "Sgt. James Crowley and several other Cambridge police officers arrived [at Dr. 
Gates’ house] and began to question Dr. Gates"). 
 12. See JAMES CROWLEY, CAMBRIDGE POLICE DEP’T., INCIDENT REPORT #9005127 
(July 16, 2009), available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/file/henry-louis-gates-jr-
police-report?page=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice) (stating Crowley said, "I could see an older black 
male standing in the foyer . . . . [so I identified myself as] Sgt. Crowly from the Cambridge 
Police . . . [and told him that I was] ‘investigating a report of a break in progress’ at the 
residence").
 13. See id. ("As I [Crowley] stood in plain view of this man, later identified as Gates, I 
asked if he would step out onto the porch and speak with me.  He replied ‘no I will not.’"). 
 14. See id. (stating that Professor Gates "demanded to know who [Sergeant Crowley] 
was"). 
 15. Id.
 16. See id. (describing that while Crowley explained that his business for being at 
Gates’ residence was to investigate a possible break-in, "Gates opened the front door and 
exclaimed ‘why, because I’m a black man in America?’"). 
 17. See id. (reporting that Crowley said, "I asked Gates to provide me with photo 
identification so that I could verify that he resided at Ware Street and so that I could radio 
my findings to [the police department]"). 
 18. See id. (explaining that Crowley declared, "I was quite surprised and confused 
with the behavior he exhibited toward me"). 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE RACIAL PROFILING ISSUE 309 
that Professor Gates produce a form of identification so that he could 
confirm that he resided there and radio it in to the police department in 
preparation for his departure from Professor Gates’ home.19  Professor 
Gates initially refused to provide identification but then offered up his 
Harvard identification card.20  The moment Sergeant Crowley verified that 
Professor Gates was indeed lawfully in his home, there was neither 
probable cause nor a reasonable suspicion that Professor Gates was the 
individual suspected of breaking and entering into his residence.21  One 
would reasonably assume that the minute Sergeant Crowley dismissed his 
suspicion regarding Professor Gates and criminal activity, the investigatory 
communication between the two men would come to an uneventful end.22
After Sergeant Crowley dismissed his suspicion regarding the break-in, he 
may have remained at Professor Gates’ house because Professor Gates 
demanded that he identify himself.23  Sergeant Crowley stated in his police 
report that Professor Gates accused him of being a racist police officer.24
Sergeant Crowley believed he had probable cause to arrest Professor Gates 
for disorderly conduct because he was offended by Professor Gates’ loud 
and offensive speech.25  The disorderly conduct charges were properly 
dismissed even if Professor Gates engaged in disrespectful speech.26  The 
disorderly conduct charge against Professor Gates would later be dismissed, 
but the incident sparked a national debate about racial profiling.27
                                                                                                                 
 19. See CROWLEY, supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text (describing how 
Crowley asked Gates for identification). 
 20. See id. (stating that "Gates initially refused [to provide identification,] demanding 
that [Crowley] show him identification but then did supply . . . a Harvard University 
identification card"). 
 21. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (stating that Crowley’s duty to 
investigate ended after Professor Gates provided identification because appropriate 
identification removed any reasonable suspicion that Gates was a possible criminal intruder). 
 22. See infra notes 63–81 and accompanying text (stating the limitations of reasonable 
suspicion and that once the suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, the investigation terminates). 
 23. See id. (stating Gates demanded Crowley’s name three times and Crowley told 
him, but when Gates demanded his name a fourth time, Crowley "told Gates that I would 
speak with him outside"). 
 24. See id. ("As I [Crowley] descended the stairs [of Gates’s residence] to the 
sidewalk, Gates continued to yell at me, accusing me of racial bias and continued to tell me I 
had not heard the last of him."). 
 25. See id. (describing that Gates exhibited a "tumultuous manner," had repeatedly 
accused Crowley of being a racist police officer, and had been warned twice by Crowley to 
calm down because he was becoming disorderly before Crowley arrested Gates). 
 26. See Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 ("Sgt. Crowley arrested Dr. Gates for disorderly 
conduct, but prosecutors quickly dropped the charges."). 
 27. See, e.g., Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 (discussing whether "the incident merely 
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In Part II, I explain the concept of racial profiling and the right not to 
be targeted by the police because of one’s race.28  In Part III, I explain how 
the initial questioning of Professor Gates at his home was permitted under 
the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
was present under the circumstances.29  In Part IV, I discuss why the 
disorderly conduct charge against Professor Gates was properly dismissed 
because speaking to a police officer in a hostile voice is protected by the 
First Amendment.30  Part V of this Article reveals that a police officer filing 
a false police report under a Massachusetts’s law regarding the race of a 
potential African-American suspect is not a crime unless the statement was 
false regarding racial profiling as a material matter.31  Part VI of the Article 
provides a summary of the lesson we can learn from the issues discussed in 
this Article.32
II.  The Concept of Racial Profiling Involves Race Conscious Targeting 
Racial profiling is by definition race conscious targeting.33  Racial 
profiling is an intentional discriminatory routine.34  African Americans are 
the chief targets in the racial profiling system.35  One commentator asserts 
                                                                                                                 
hardened people’s preconceptions [about racial profiling,] or has it shown them something 
they didn’t realize about how the real world operates"). 
 28. See infra notes 33–62 and accompanying text (discussing the discrimination of 
racial profiling, race conscious targeting, and Fourth Amendment rights). 
 29. See infra notes 63–112 and accompanying text (describing that Gates’ behavior 
allowed Crowley to question Gates because there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity on the premises and citing cases to support this).  
 30. See infra notes 113–134 and accompanying text (citing cases supporting First 
Amendment rights of free speech in the context of the disorderly conduct charge). 
 31. See infra notes 135–186 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts law 
about the subject of racial profiling and how it would apply to Crowley’s report). 
 32. See infra Part V (suggesting how to counter racial profiling:  "In order to close the 
racial divide on the issue of racial profiling, it is necessary to provide sensitive training to all 
Americans"). 
 33. See Allison A. Hendrix, Reinforcing Batson Defining the Peculiar:  Racial 
Profiling as an Impermissible Ground for Peremptory Challenge, 44 No. 5 CRIM. L. BULL.
691, 695 (2008) ("Racial profiling is defined as ‘the law enforcement practice of using race, 
national origin, or ethnicity as a salient basis for suspicion of criminal activity.’" (citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (8th ed. 2004))). 
 34. See id. at 695–96 (discussing the routineness of law enforcement officers 
investigating on the basis of race alone). 
 35. See id. at 695 ("African-Americans remain the primary victims of racial profiling." 
(citing Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the 
Selective Enforcement of Laws:  In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 722 
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that usually racial profiling may be described as thinking of a person as a 
suspect because of a stereotypical perception that people identified with that 
individual’s racial classification are expected to perform the kind of crime 
under examination.36  The expression "racial profiling" as a general matter 
does not apply to an examination of a specific crime once an injured party 
or bystander has recognized the race of the alleged criminal and law 
enforcement officers use race as a factor while making determinations 
regarding which suspicious persons to target for interrogation.37  Racial 
profiling has proven to be an unsuccessful tool because statistics fail to 
show a relevant relationship involving race and crime.38  Unfortunately, 
racial profiling is a function of our popular culture as well as general 
stereotypes regarding race.39  As a result, cultural stereotypes involving 
racial profiling are complicated issues for the law to remedy.40  The arrest 
of Harvard University Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. motivated many 
people to openly discuss the enduring, ugly truth presented by the practice 
of racial profiling.41  There is a growing consensus that racial profiling 
                                                                                                                 
(2004))). 
 36. See Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact 
Claims Would Not Harm National Security—A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 503, 522–23 (2009) ("Most commonly, racial profiling refers to treating an individual 
differently based upon the belief that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group are 
more likely to commit the type of crime being investigated." (citing Kevin R. Johnson, 
Racial Profiling After September 11:  The Department of Justice’s 2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY.
L. REV. 67, 79 (2004)). 
 37. See id. at 523 ("The term racial profiling is not typically used to describe an 
investigation of a particular crime where a victim or witness has identified the race of the 
perpetrator, and the police consider race in decisions about which suspects to question or 
otherwise investigate." (citing DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 49 (New Press 2003)). 
 38. See id. at 524–25 ("The most commonly studied racial profiling context is the 
practice of pretextual traffic stops, where the true reason for the stop is not the minor traffic 
violation, but that the driver is black." (citing Deborah Ramirez et al., Defining Racial 
Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1211 (2003)).  "This 
practice exists despite the fact that ‘no data demonstrates [sic] either a general or a 
circumstantial correlation between race and crime.’"  Id.
 39. See Neil Gotanda, Computer Games, Racial Pleasure, and Discursive Racial 
Spaces, 72 ALB. L. REV. 929, 935 (2009) ("Based upon the target person’s body and cultural 
configuration (dress, style, language), the profiler selects a racial profile from available 
popular culture and ‘common sense’ racial understandings." (citing Neil Gotanda, New
Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. (forthcoming Summer 
2009)). 
 40. See id. ("The controversies surrounding racial profiling in law enforcement 
reinforce the idea that cultural factors are not easily modified by such traditional avenues as 
statutory reforms or judicial decisions."). 
 41. See M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109, 
110 (2009) (stating the arrest of Professor Gates "has revivified conversations regarding 
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection principle in theory,42
but in fact, it is virtually impossible to prove racial profiling as a 
constitutional violation because of the Supreme Court’s discriminatory 
intent requirement.43  If the Equal Protection Clause is the sole remedy for 
racial profiling by the police, the Supreme Court has granted African-
American criminal defendants a very challenging equal protection right it 
knows is very difficult to enforce.44
"Racial profiling" is also defined as actions by police officers or other 
government officials in enforcing laws based on racial stereotyping, rather 
than the "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause" standard.45  Probable 
cause is present when an officer acting as a reasonable person has enough 
facts to think that a crime occurred or is taking place.46  On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                 
race-consciousness" and "also called attention to the continuing reality of racial profiling"). 
 42. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the 
Land:  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly 
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1048 (2010) ("Racial profiling . . . runs counter to 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law."). 
 43. See id. at 1049 ("The Court held [in Washington v. Davis] that discriminatory 
intent must also be proved.  Because it poses a formidable barrier to proving Equal 
Protection claims, the discriminatory intent requirement has been the subject of sustained 
scholarly criticism." (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235–36, 248 (1976); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent:  Do We Know How Legal 
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 
319–21 (1987); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in 
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 808–09, 877–78 (2004); Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate 
Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133 (2010))). 
 44. See id. at 1063 ("In holding that the Equal Protection Clause was the exclusive 
remedy for a race-based pretextual stop based on probable cause for a violation of the traffic 
laws, Whren v. United States failed to persuasively justify that conclusion.")  "Moreover, it 
left criminal defendants . . . with a toothless equal protection remedy that, more often than 
not, will leave them with an unenforceable right."  Id.
 45. See DARIN D. FREDRICKSON & RAYMOND P. SILJANDER, RACIAL PROFILING:
ELIMINATING THE CONFUSION BETWEEN RACIAL AND CRIMINAL PROFILING AND CLARIFYING 
WHAT CONSTITUTES UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AND PERSECUTION 15 (2002) ("Racial profiling 
is a term that is generally understood to mean enforcement action on the part of police 
officers that is motivated more by racial bias than by any reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause that may exist under the circumstances."). 
 46. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) 
("‘Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge 
and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed,’ and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be 
searched." (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949))). 
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reasonable suspicion is satisfied when there is a chance of finding evidence 
of wrongdoing supported by clear and articulable facts.47  The Constitution 
was designed to afford all Americans the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.48  A Fourth 
Amendment seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer or his agent 
"terminates or restrains ones freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied" in order to display his authority.49  African 
Americans contend their constitutional rights against unreasonable seizures 
or searches are not respected in the criminal justice process.50
Race is often a key fact in the law enforcement assessment of whether 
to investigate African Americans for criminal activity.51  The Constitution 
makes it illegal for the police to investigate a person because of race.52
Nevertheless, public officials eager to demonstrate support for law and 
order often unfairly target African Americans because of their race for 
criminalization and prison.53  Racial profiling is the systematic, 
unreasonable targeting of African Americans as engaging in suspicious 
criminal behavior.54  Professor Weatherspoon has written an excellent 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See id. ("[W]e have attempted to flesh out the knowledge component [known as 
‘reasonable suspicion’] by looking to the degree to which known facts imply prohibited 
conduct, the specificity of the information received, and the reliability of its source.")  "At 
the end of the day, however, we have realized that these factors cannot rigidly control, and 
we have come back to saying that the standards are ‘fluid concepts that take their substantive 
content from the particular contexts’ in which they are being assessed."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  
 48. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . ."). 
 49. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989)). 
 50. See Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the 
Selective Enforcement of Laws:  In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 722 
(2004) ("African-Americans feel that their constitutional rights have been marginalized by 
the very systems in place to protect their rights."). 
 51. See id. at 723 ("Too often, race is the determinative factor used by law 
enforcement officers to justify a stop and search of African-Americans.").  "Even though the 
Constitution prohibits such conduct by law enforcement agencies, these practices have 
become the norm, not the exception."  Id.
 52. See id. (stating that the Constitution prohibits law enforcement officers from using 
race as a determinative factor to justify a stop and search of African Americans). 
 53. See id. at 723–24 ("[I]n their zeal to enforce public laws, governmental officials 
have selected African-Americans and other minorities solely on the basis of their race to 
stop, arrest, charge, prosecute, and incarcerate." (citing PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (Feb. 2001))). 
 54. See id. at 725 ("Unfortunately, racial profiling of African-Americans appears to be 
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article that focuses on how to reduce and ultimately eradicate official racial 
profiling.55  Professor Weatherspoon argues that only a forceful 
condemnation of race profiling by public officials will bring a timely end to 
the tradition of race profiling of African Americans.56
Professor Gates’ statement, labeling Sergeant Crowley as a racist cop 
without any substantial objective evidence, might be explained by his 
subjective Black experience.57  In my view, Professor Gates’ subjective 
Black experience initially suggested to him that he was targeted for an 
unwelcomed police treatment at his home primarily because of his race.58
The Black experience, as well as relevant history, probably contributes to 
the inability of some African Americans to separate the past from the 
present when interacting with white law enforcement officers because some 
white police officers bring a Jim Crow attitude with them whenever they 
interact with any black person for any reason.59
President Obama suggested that Cambridge police officer, Officer 
Sergeant Crowley, may have "acted stupidly" by arresting Professor Gates 
after it was determined that Professor Gates had not committed a crime, 
even if his entrance to his home was under rather suspicious 
circumstances.60  In order for an officer to conduct a reasonable search or 
                                                                                                                 
ingrained in the minds of many law enforcement officers and has become a part of their 
standard operating procedures."). 
 55. See id. (suggesting "[a] holistic approach to remedying racial profiling has to be 
developed to address . . . conduct by law enforcement officials"). 
 56. See id. (advocating a holistic, "frontal attack [on eradicating racial profiling of 
African Americans] must occur at all levels of government, the judiciary, by private citizens, 
and various community and civil rights organizations"). 
 57. See generally Hendrix, supra note 33, at 696 ("[I]ncidents of racial profiling have 
a long-lasting impact on their victims.") (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THREAT AND 
HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 21 (2004)).  "African-Americans have reported feelings of depression, helplessness, 
and humiliation.  As a result of being subject to racial profiling, African-Americans have 
also reported a diminished trust in law enforcement and a reluctance to seek the assistance of 
law enforcement."  Id.
 58. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing possible reasons for 
Gates’ reaction as well as the errors on the part of Crowley). 
 59. See generally Weatherspoon, supra note 50, at 724 ("[F]or African-Americans, 
[equal protection] rights are merely a mirage of what white Americans receive and take for 
granted . . . .").  "Too often, race is the determinative factor used by law enforcement officers 
to justify a stop and search of African-Americans."  Id.
 60. See Cooper, supra note 3, at A20 (acknowledging that President Obama initially 
said "that the Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there was already 
proof that they were in their own home"); see also Peter Baker & Helen Cooper, A
Presidential Pitfall:  Speaking One’s Mind, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/us/politics/27memo.html?_r=1&ref=helene_cooper 
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seizure of an individual, he must satisfy the requirements established in the 
Fourth Amendment.61  The Fourth Amendment guarantees people freedom 
in their persons and houses from an unreasonable search or seizure, but it 
does not prohibit an officer from conducting a reasonable investigation of 
possible criminal activity.62
III.  The Initial Questioning of Professor Gates is Permitted Under the 
Fourth Amendment Because Reasonable Suspicion Exists
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court gave police the authority to 
conduct an investigatory stop to briefly seize or detain a person when 
there is a reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity . . . [is] afoot."63
An investigatory stop occurs when an officer detains an individual for 
a limited time to dispel his or her suspicion of criminal activity.64 "The 
Fourth Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches 
and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures."65
In order to decide whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, 
courts should be guided by common sense and ordinary human 
experience.66  The Supreme Court in United States v. Sharpe67 and in 
                                                                                                                 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice) (stating that President Obama "declared that the police in Cambridge, Mass., 
had ‘acted stupidly’ in arresting a prominent black scholar at his own home"). 
 61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Brendlin v. California and 
its definition of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements). 
 62. See Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing that 
one exception to Fourth Amendment protection is probable cause "based on the totality of 
the circumstances, and requires reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a 
reasonable officer to believe that the person about to be seized has committed or is about to 
commit a crime" (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1116 (10th Cir. 2007))). 
 63. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that "a police officer [who] 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience 
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous . . . [may] conduct a carefully limited search"). 
 64. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) ("In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
30 (1968), we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative 
purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal 
activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause."). 
 65. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
 66. See id. at 685 (balancing the rights of the individual under investigation with the 
law enforcement interest in effectively achieving the purposes of a stop).   
 67. See id. at 675, 688 (holding that a twenty minute investigatory stop is not 
unconstitutional if law enforcement officers act diligently to achieve the purpose of the 
stop). 
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Terry v. Ohio68 articulated a twofold inquiry for judging the 
reasonableness of an investigative stop.69  Under this inquiry, a court 
will consider "whether the officer’s action was justified at its 
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."70
If officers are justified in making an investigative stop—to detain 
and ask a person questions in the first place, and subsequently work to 
dispel or confirm their suspicion of criminal activity, which should be 
the only reason why they instituted the stop—then the stop will 
typically be considered reasonable.71  Thus, the investigative stop will 
not be considered unconstitutional.72  A brief investigatory stop by a 
police officer does not require probable cause.73  When a police officer 
is making a custodial arrest, the officer needs probable cause to believe 
that a crime has occurred or is about to take place.  Sergeant Crowley 
did not need probable cause to approach Professor Gates at his house 
because Sergeant Crowley’s brief questioning of Professor Gates was 
permissible.74  Sergeant Crowley possessed reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity at Professor Gates home.75 Reasonable suspicion is 
satisfied when there is "specific and articulable" evidence of criminal 
activity.76  The criminal activity giving rise to the investigatory stop 
may have previously occurred or is one that has not occurred but is 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8 (stating that the Court should evaluate whether the officer 
acted reasonably under the circumstances in determining the legality of the investigative 
stop). 
 69. See Sharpe, 470 U.S at 682 (referring to the "dual inquiry for evaluating the 
reasonableness of an investigative stop"). 
 70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).  
 71. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (acknowledging that a 
search is presumed to be constitutional if it is justifiable at its inception and reasonable in its 
scope). 
 72. See id. at 686 (holding that an investigative stop satisfying the two-pronged 
analysis will be considered constitutional).   
 73. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (distinguishing between a "stop" and an "arrest"; the 
latter requires probable cause, whereas the former does not).   
 74. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (summarizing the series of events leading to 
Sergeant Crowley’s reasonable belief that a crime was being committed and that a 
preliminary investigation was necessary).   
 75. See id. (describing Professor Gates’ behavior as suspicious, especially in light of 
Mrs. Whalen’s concerned telephone call).   
 76. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("In justifying the particular intrusion the 
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."). 
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likely to occur.77  In forming their suspicion, courts have allowed 
officers to draw from their personal knowledge or cumulative 
information made available to them through a reliable third party.78
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Watson held that informants 
could give rise to reasonable suspicion so long as the information 
revealed had some indication of reliability.79
During the duration of the investigative stop, police officers are 
limited to "reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the 
suspicion" of criminal activity.80  Officers must have a reasonable suspicion 
that the individual is engaging or has engaged in criminal activity as a pre-
requisite to conducting the investigative stop.81
Mrs. Whalen’s telephone call provided the officers with sufficient 
evidence to establish a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have 
occurred or could occur.82  The officers had a reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory questioning of Professor Gates regarding alleged 
criminal activity.83  The relevant facts pertaining to the Professor Gates-
Sergeant Crowley situation are:  1) Ms. Whalen made a call to the 
Cambridge police describing a possible break-in at Professor Gates place of 
residence; 2) Sergeant Crowley along with his fellow officers were 
dispatched to Professor Gates’ home; 3) Sergeant Crowley arrived at 
Professor Gates’ residence and through the front door observed "an older 
black male;" 4) Professor Gates initially refused to step out on the porch to 
speak to Sergeant Crowley, but after Sergeant Crowley identified himself as 
a police officer, Professor Gates opened his front door; 5) Sergeant Crowley 
asked  Professor Gates to show him some form of identification to quickly 
dispel his suspicion that Professor Gates was the "possible intruder"; and 6) 
Professor Gates initially refused but eventually submitted to Sergeant 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that, 
under precedent, an investigatory stop is legal if "an officer has reasonable suspicion that a 
crime has previously been committed by an individual").   
 78. See id. (allowing law enforcement officers to rely on their own experience in the 
field to form a suspicion that a crime is being or has been committed).   
 79. See United States v. Watson, 558 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that tips 
can provide the basis for an investigative stop in certain circumstances). 
 80. Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1016. 
 81. See id. ("Reasonable suspicion must be supported by ‘specific and articulable 
facts.’" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). 
 82. See discussion supra Part II (applying the Hughes and Terry framework to the 
facts surrounding Prof. Gates’ arrest).
 83. See id. (arguing that the phone call, combined with Professor Gates’ behavior, 
gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that Gates was involved in criminal activity). 
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Crowley’s request for identification by giving his Harvard identification 
card to Sergeant Crowley inside Professor Gates’ home.84
When Mrs. Whalen made the call informing the dispatcher of a 
possible break-in at the residence, she gave the officers "concrete and 
articulable" facts that formed the basis of their reasonable suspicion.85
Armed with reasonable suspicion, the officers were well within the scope of 
their duties under the Fourth Amendment to investigate the risk of criminal 
activity at Professor Gates’ residence.86  Not every questioning of a resident 
at his home invokes Fourth Amendment protection.87  Only an unreasonable 
seizure of a person invokes Fourth Amendment protections.88  Courts have 
held that a reasonable detention occurs in the commission of an 
investigatory stop when the defendant’s submission to the officer’s show of 
authority results in a brief interference with their freedom of movement but 
not amounting to a full custodial arrest.89  Because show of authority by a 
police officer when interacting with an individual can occur with or without 
the use of physical force before a custodial arrest, courts must consider the 
circumstances surrounding the submission by an individual to the 
investigating officer.90
When Sergeant Crowley arrived at Professor Gates’ home and initially 
asked Professor Gates to step outside, Professor Gates’ refusal may have 
given Sergeant Crowley, under the circumstances, enough reasonable 
suspicion necessary to continue conducting investigatory questioning of 
Professor Gates.91  The mere fact that Sergeant Crowley asked Professor 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (summarizing the events leading up to Professor 
Gates’ arrest). 
 85. Id.
 86. See Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) ("[P]olice should be allowed to ‘stop’ a 
person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be connected with 
criminal activity."). 
 87. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) ("The Fourth Amendment 
is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."). 
 88. See id. (differentiating between general searches and seizures and unreasonable 
searches and seizures; only the latter triggers Fourth Amendment protection). 
 89. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that the suspect 
was not detained until he was physically tackled because the suspect did not comply with the 
officer’s initial showing of authority). 
 90. See id. at 626 (presenting a range of hypothetical situations to demonstrate that the 
court should consider the circumstances of each case in determining whether a suspect has 
submitted to law enforcement officers). 
 91. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (describing the events leading up to Professor Gates’ 
arrest).
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Gates to open the door alone is insufficient to establish an arrest because 
Sergeant Crowley had not "restrained the liberty of a citizen" enough to 
constitute a seizure.92  If Professor Gates, as a reasonable person, were free 
to end his encounter with Sergeant Crowley, the communicative encounter 
would not constitute an unreasonable seizure.93  The investigative stop 
would start the moment Professor Gates submitted to Sergeant Crowley’s 
"show of authority" by opening the door to his house because a reasonable 
person under the circumstances "would not feel free to terminate the 
encounter."94
Professor Gates may have opened his door to Sergeant Crowley 
because a reasonable person in Professor Gates’ position may have believed 
he was not free to end the visit until after Sergeant Crowley entered 
Professor Gates home to dismiss his suspicion of criminal activity on the 
part of Professor Gates.95  Sergeant Crowley’s duty to investigate the 
situation ended after Professor Gates provided him with his Harvard 
identification because appropriate identification should have removed any 
reasonable suspicion that Professor Gates was a "possible criminal intruder" 
in his own home.96
The initial arrival and investigatory questioning of Professor Gates to 
determine whether he was the possible criminal intruder that Mrs. Whalen 
reported to the dispatcher was a reasonable use of Sergeant Crowley’s 
policing power, because Sergeant Crowley possessed reasonable evidence 
that a burglary had occurred or was likely to occur at Professor Gates’ 
residence by unknown suspects.97  The fact that Sergeant Crowley came to 
Professor Gates’ home because he had reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity taking place challenges the argument that Professor Gates was 
initially targeted because he was black.  Racial profiling occurs when an 
officer violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
searches or seizures when he does not possess a reasonable suspicion 
stemming from "concrete and coherent" evidence and instead uses race as a 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980). 
 93. See United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 2009) (indicating that a 
search becomes a seizure when a reasonable person believes that he is not free to end the 
encounter). 
 94. Id. at 774.
 95. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (noting that Professor Gates opened the front door to 
speak with law enforcement officers). 
 96. Id.
 97. See id. (revealing Sergeant Crowley’s reasonable belief that a burglary had 
occurred or was in progress at the Gates’ home based on Mrs. Whalen’s observations). 
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factor while targeting a person for investigative purposes.98  When racial 
stereotyping is the predominant factor in the officer’s encounter with the 
target, racial profiling occurs.99  Because the Cambridge police were 
responding to a phone call indicating reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity from Mrs. Whalen without any reference to the suspect being 
African American, it can be argued that the initial arrival to Professor 
Gates’ home may not have involved racial profiling.  In Professor Gates’ 
narrative, police initially arrived at his house to investigate possible 
criminal conduct.100  The Cambridge police were dispatched to Professor 
Gates’ home after Mrs. Whalen made a call to 911 to report a break-in.101
Throughout Mrs. Whalen’s conversation with the 911 dispatcher, she tried 
to avoid making race a factor in her description of possible criminal 
intruders; however, she ultimately described the intruders as possibly 
Hispanic after being probed by the 911 dispatcher.102  Once Sergeant 
Crowley arrived at Professor Gates’ home as an officer of the law, he was 
acting within the scope of his job to investigate the possibility of criminal 
activity inside the house because he received information creating a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was taking place inside of 
Professor Gates’ home.103
The decision by Sergeant Crowley to arrest Professor Gates for 
disorderly conduct is not reasonably linked to the suspicion of criminal 
activity that initially made Professor Gates a reasonable Fourth Amendment 
target of the investigation.104  It can be argued that both Sergeant Crowley 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See FREDRICKSON & SILJANDER, supra note 45, at 46 ("[A] stop that is made 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and therefore is without legal basis, is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment."). 
 99. See id. at 15 ("Racial profiling is a term that is generally understood to mean 
enforcement action on the part of police officers that is motivated more by racial bias than 
by any reasonable suspicion or probable cause that may exist under the circumstances."). 
 100. See Nemeth, supra note 10, at 1 ("The brouhaha erupted when Cambridge Police 
Sgt. James Crowley investigated a potential burglary at the home of Harvard professor 
Henry Louis Gates Jr."). 
 101. See id. (identifying Mrs. Whalen as the concerned neighbor who notified the 
police of a potential robbery at the Gates’ home).
 102. See Frank Rich, Small Beer, Big Hangover, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at A8, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/opinion/02rich.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice) 
(discussing the lack of racial identification in Mrs. Whalen’s report to the police). 
 103. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (demonstrating that Sgt. Crowley formed a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed or was in commission at the Gates’ 
home after Mrs. Whalen described a man attempting to break into the house). 
 104. See id. (demonstrating that Sgt. Crowley arrested Professor Gates for disorderly 
conduct that occurred during their confrontation, not for actions connected to the suspected 
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and Professor Gates "acted unreasonably" or "overreacted."105 Professor 
Gates and Sergeant Crowley may have allowed default stereotyping to 
cloud their respective judgments.  Default stereotyping occurs when the 
negative preconceived notions that an individual brings to the table when 
interacting with an individual from a specific racial or ethnic group is a 
predominant factor in analyzing a given situation. 
Professor Gates, a distinguished African American Scholar at Harvard, 
one of the country’s most respected universities, may have engaged in 
default stereotyping speech by challenging the authority of Officer Sergeant 
Crowley to investigate a crime by immediately assuming that he was being 
targeted for criminal activity only because he was "a black man in 
America," who happened to live in a predominately white neighborhood in 
Cambridge.106   On the other hand, Sergeant Crowley may have engaged in 
default stereotyping speech under the circumstances by stating in error that 
Mrs. Whalen referred to an African-American male, as the suspected 
criminal intruder attempting to unlawfully enter into Professor Gates’ 
residence, in his police report.107  Who knows what actually prompted 
Sergeant Crowley to make false statements in his police report by 
indicating that Mrs. Whalen had identified the "suspected criminal" as 
black?108  It is possible that Sergeant Crowley was trying to avoid a later 
charge that Professor Gates was targeted because of his race by falsely and 
unreasonably stating in his police report that Mrs. Whalen had identified the 
suspects as black in her 911 call.109
                                                                                                                 
robbery).
 105. See Fletcher & Shear, supra note 9, at A1 (quoting President Obama, who 
described both individuals as acting unreasonably). 
 106. Krissah Thompson, Scholar Says Arrest Will Lead Him to Explore Race in 
Criminal Justice, WASH. POST, July 22, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/21/AR2009072101771.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 107. See id. (quoting Professor Gates as stating, "if [Mrs. Whalen] saw someone 
tomorrow that looked like they were breaking in, I would want her to call 911).  Professor 
Gates continued: 
I would want the police to come.  What I would not want is to be presumed 
guilty.  That’s what the deal was.  It didn’t matter how I was dressed.  It didn’t 
matter how I talked.  It didn’t matter how I comported myself.  That man was 
convinced that I was guilty.  Id.
 108. See Rich, supra note 102, at A8 (acknowledging that there is no way of knowing 
whether race played a role in Sergeant Crowley’s decision to arrest Professor Gates). 
 109. See id. ("In his police report, Sgt. James Crowley portrayed Whalen as a racial 
profiler by saying she had told him that the two men at Gates’ door were black."). 
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When Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley return to their regular 
activities after their meeting with President Obama, one commentator 
considers whether the nation will learn anything from the incident.110
President Obama correctly observed that the dispute between Professor 
Gates and Sergeant Crowley provided Americans with a "teaching 
moment."111  The lesson from this is that presumptions based on default 
racial stereotypes by either an African American or a professional white 
police officer are harmful to race relations in America.  While making a 911 
call, Mrs. Whalen as a solid citizen believed she could help fight crime 
without engaging in either race profiling or default stereotyping.112
IV.  The Disorderly Conduct Charges Against Professor Gates Were 
Dismissed Because Hostile Speech is Protected 
Sergeant Crowley may have acted unwisely in the minutes after he 
responded to a possible break-in by converting his investigation into an 
unconstitutional disorderly conduct arrest because he was insulted by 
Professor Gates’ offensive speech.113    The First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause protects any offensive speech Professor Gates may have directed at 
Sergeant Crowley during their conversation.114
The Courts have long been concerned with communications 
between American citizens and police officers.  In City of Houston v. 
Hill,115 the Supreme Court warned officers of the law that "the First 
Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and 
challenge directed at police officers."116  The Court in City of Houston
deemed it an unconstitutional act to arrest someone for merely verbally 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 (considering the potential lessons to be learned 
on both sides of the incident following a meeting with President Obama). 
 111. Fletcher & Shear, supra note 9, at A1 (quoting Obama as referring to the incident 
as a "teachable moment"). 
 112. See Rich, supra note 102, at A8 (noting that Mrs. Whalen’s 911 call did not refer 
to race). 
 113. See Cooper, supra note 3, at A20 (noting that President Obama disapproved of 
Sergeant Crowley’s decision to arrest Prof. Gates after it was clear that he was in his own 
home). 
 114. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that Congress shall make no law "abridging the 
freedom of speech"). 
 115. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects expressive disorderly speech). 
 116. Id. at 461.
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opposing and/or interrupting a police officer in furtherance of his 
duties.117  Courts have recognized the freedom of citizens when 
communicating with government officials to speak their mind, ask 
questions, criticize and express their opinion, which is a substantial 
right granted to every citizen through the First Amendment.118  The 
inventory of unprotected speech involves incitements to violence, libel, 
obscenity, fighting words and commercial advertising.119  The first move in 
analyzing every First Amendment problem is to examine the checklist of 
"unprotected" categories of speech to find out whether any category 
includes the communication in question.120
In the present case, between Sergeant Crowley and Professor Gates, it 
is undisputed that words were exchanged between the two men at Professor 
Gates’ residence.121  The specific words that were exchanged may not ever 
be known, but according to Sergeant Crowley’s police report, Professor 
Gates was arrested because of the "tumultuous behavior Professor Gates 
exhibited in and out of his residence."122  Sergeant Crowley believed it was 
necessary to arrest and charge Professor Gates with disorderly conduct, but 
the charge was later dismissed because there was not enough probable 
cause.123  If the tumultuous behavior or disorderly conduct charge was in 
reference to an alleged verbal outburst by Professor Gates when he accused 
Sergeant Crowley of being a racist cop, it was necessary and proper for 
public officials in Cambridge to subsequently drop the charges against 
Professor Gates.  As a general rule, the First Amendment protects your right 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See id. (holding that the Constitution protects mere verbal opposition to actions of 
law enforcement officials). 
 118. See id. ("[A] certain amount of expressive disorder not only is inevitable in a 
society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would 
survive."). 
 119. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging:  The Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992); see also Keith Werhan, The 
Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 53–66 
(1994) (placing First Amendment decisions in context to assess the Court’s evolving views 
on free speech). 
 120. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:  A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization 
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975) (arguing 
that the threshold question in addressing free speech issues is whether the expression fits into 
a protected category of expression).   
 121. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (documenting the conversation between Sergeant 
Crowley and Professor Gates). 
 122. Id.
 123. See id. (revealing Sergeant Crowley’s state of mind when he decided to arrest 
Professor Gates and that he believed Professor Gates’ behavior was creating a disturbance). 
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to call a police officer a racist cop.124  In my view, offensive speech directed 
to a police officer is high-risk speech that is likely to lead to your unlawful 
arrest or other harm.  Although Professor Gates yelled and called Sergeant 
Crowley a racist cop, his offensive speech does not fall within any of the 
four exceptions to the First Amendment’s protection for free speech. 
One who unwisely directs offensive speech against armed police 
officers is protected under the First Amendment, unless his speech is 
"directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless actions and is likely to 
produce such actions."125  In plain words, accusing a police officer of being 
a racist cop while on the front porch of one’s residence is not likely to fall 
within the Supreme Court’s definition of unprotected speech.  Since the 
Supreme Court has recognized the use of the expletive "fuck the draft" 
while wearing a jacket in the Los Angles Court House to protest war is 
protected speech under the First Amendment, it is probably permissible 
under the First Amendment to call a police officer a racist at your home as 
an act of either historical protest or clear and present anger without danger 
is protected offensive expression.126  Professor Daniel A. Farber has 
appropriately described Cohen v. California as an important case that stated 
unambiguously that offensiveness was not sufficient to categorize speech as 
fighting words.127  In order to qualify as fighting words, the speech should 
be directed at the listener and reasonably expected to arouse a violent 
response.128  Federal courts have condemned the using of "disorderly 
conduct" charges as a way to abridge an individual’s freedom of speech.129
Disorderly conduct charges are proper only when an individual uses such 
speech to incite immediate lawless action and the speech is likely to 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (protecting an individual’s 
right to use disorderly speech during an arrest or investigation). 
 125. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 126. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the government may 
not criminalize the use or display of offensive language). 
 127. See Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in 
American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 921 n.19 (2009) (noting that mere 
offensiveness is not sufficient to raise an expression to the level of fighting words). 
 128. See id.
 129. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (stating that the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech forbids states to punish language not within "narrowly 
limited classes of speech").  In Hess, appellant argued that Indiana’s disorderly conduct 
statute was unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 105.  The court found that Hess’s use of an 
expletive was neither directed at the arresting officer nor directed towards inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action.  Id. at 108.  The State could therefore not punish Hess’s 
words on the grounds that they had a "tendency to lead to violence."  Id. at 109. 
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produce such action.130  Prosecution for actions amounting to offensive 
speech without more is prohibited by the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment.131  An arrest for simply using offensive words is unlawful, 
unless, the speech is "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of 
a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, 
annoyance or unrest."132  Since the conversation between Sergeant Crowley 
and citizen Professor Gates does not amount to the type of substantive evil 
that escapes First Amendment scrutiny, Professor Gates had the First 
Amendment right to call Sergeant Crowley a racist cop just before his 
foreseeable unlawful arrest by Sergeant Crowley.133  My Black experience 
informs me that if a black male calls a white police officer a racist cop in a 
face-to-face confrontation the officer will quickly find a legitimate or pre-
textual reason to arrest his black accuser that has a plausible justification.134
V.  A False Police Report Under Massachusetts Law is Not a Crime Unless 
it Contains a Material Matter 
In arresting a highly respected African-American historian who 
teaches at Harvard, Sergeant Crowley may have realized for the first time, 
while preparing his police report, that he had "waded into the politically 
charged swamp of race in America"135 and that his interaction with 
Professor Gates is only politically correct if Mrs. Whalen described the 
potential criminal intruders at Professor Gates’ home as black.136  On 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See id. at 108–09 (citing the standard established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 131. See id. (noting that the State can only limit an individual’s speech if it incites 
immediate lawless action and is likely to produce the action). 
 132. See Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (discussing the exceptions to the 
First Amendment protection of freedom of speech). 
 133. See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108–09 (finding that use of an expletive did not have a 
tendency to incite violence and therefore, the State could not punish the words); see also
CROWLEY, supra note 12 (stating that the action leading to an arrest was merely the 
accusation that the investigating officer was a racist). 
 134. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the subjective Black experience). 
 135. Editorial, The Crass Politics of Race, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, at 
A10, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20100111-Editorial-The-
crass-politics-of-6915.ece (discussing the use of race in American politics) (last visited Mar. 
27, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 136. See discussion supra Part III (discussing that the caller actually identified the 
intruders as possibly being Hispanic, but that the police report states the caller identified the 
intruders as two black men). 
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Thursday, July 16, 2009, Professor Gates of Cambridge was arrested at 
Ware Street for demonstrating loud public behavior.137  The loud public 
behavior was directed at a Sergeant Crowley who was at Ware Street to 
investigate the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.138  Sergeant 
Crowley heard a police broadcast of a break-in, in progress at the Ware 
Street address, Professor Gates’ home.139  Sergeant Crowley said, "Due to 
my proximity, I responded."140  After Sergeant Crowley arrived at the Ware 
Street address he radioed Ms. Whalen, the white female caller, and asked 
her to meet him at the front door of the residence.141  While Whalen was 
standing on the sidewalk in front of Professor Gates’ residence, she 
informed Sergeant Crowley that she was the person who made the call.142
According to Sergeant Crowley, while standing on the sidewalk, "Whalen 
told me that she saw two black males on the porch of Ware Street, and one 
of them was trying to force entry into the home."143
It should not come as a surprise if Sergeant Crowley took his clue 
from Professor Gates in trying to utilize the race card to his advantage in 
describing their interaction in his police report.144  Sergeant Crowley’s 
police report strongly suggests Professor Gates expressly invoked the race 
card before Sergeant Crowley.145  After Sergeant Crowley asked Professor 
Gates to step out on the porch and speak with him, Professor Gates said, 
"No I will not."146  Professor Gates then demanded to know the identity of 
Sergeant Crowley.147  Sergeant Crowley told Professor Gates that he was 
Sergeant Crowley from the Cambridge Police and that he was investigating 
a report of a break-in, in progress at the residence.148  While he was making 
this statement, Professor Gates opened his front door and asked whether he 
                                                                                                                 




 141. CROWLEY, supra note 12. 
 142. Id.
 143. Id.
 144. See id. (describing how Professor Gates asked the officer if he was being 
investigated because he was black).
 145. See id. (describing how Professor Gates told a person on the other end of the 
telephone that he was "dealing with a racist police officer"). 
 146. CROWLEY, supra note 12. 
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
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was being investigated because he was "a black man in America."149  By 
accusing the police officer of possessing a criminal suspicion simply 
because he was a black man in America, Professor Gates was issuing 
Sergeant an open invitation to play the race card game.150  Professor Gates 
perceived that he might have a tactical advantage based on the intersection 
of race and class because of his professional status as a Harvard 
professor.151  One can only make an educated guess as to why Professor 
Gates used the race card so quickly in this rather routine investigation of 
apparent suspicious criminal activity152  Professor Gates may have utilized 
the race card in a routine fashion when interacting with Sergeant Crowley 
because his understanding of the history of American race relations reveals 
that he might have a politically correct advantage by accusing Sergeant 
Crowley of acting like a racist.153  "Race remains the third rail of American 
politics because politicians wield it as a blunt weapon for convenient 
political advantage."154  America deserves better than the same old heated 
race card games from Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley, as well as its 
two major political parties.155  Unfortunately, "the race and ‘greater sin’ 
cards are being played by Republicans and Democrats."156  In the situation 
involving Professor Gates and Sergeant Crowley, President Obama became 
a diplomat to control the race card damage created by the controversy.157
After Professor Gates opened his door, Sergeant Crowley then asked 
Professor Gates if there was someone else in the residence.158  Professor 
Gates yelled and told Sergeant Crowley that it was none of his business 
who was in the residence and accused Sergeant Crowley of being a racist 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id.
 150. See id. (stating that Professor Gates was the first party to invoke the issue of race 
verbally). 
 151. See Thompson, supra note 2, at A4 (discussing Professor Gates’ background as a 
scholar in the history of racism). 
 152. See CROWLEY, supra note 12 (stating that Gates brought up race almost 
immediately upon answering the door). 
 153. See Thompson, supra note 2, at A4 (providing an account of Gates discussing his 
in-depth knowledge of the history of racism). 
 154. Editorial, The Crass Politics Of Race, supra note 135, at A10. 
 155. See id. (discussing how the Democratic and Republican Parties utilize the issue of 
race). 
 156. Id.
 157. See Kalson, supra note 11, at A1 (stating that President Obama prepared to bring 
the parties together for discusssion after the incident).
 158. CROWLEY, supra note 12. 
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police officer.159  After Professor Gates invoked the race card continuously 
throughout his encounter with Sergeant Crowley, one can better understand 
why Sergeant Crowley felt compelled to retaliate with his own perceived 
race card advantage by stating in his police report that he was not just 
looking for any criminals but a black criminal, which would give him a 
perceived race card advantage.160  An allegation by Sergeant Crowley’s 
police report that witness Whalen told him the suspected criminal intruders 
were black, if false, could have legal implications for Sergeant Crowley if a 
charge is filed against him alleging that he filed a false police report under 
Massachusetts law.161
On April 16, 1985, Edwin W. Driscoll reported a stolen car.162  On May 
10, 1985, the defendant located Driscoll’s car and prepared an incident 
report.163  An incident report is a form used by the Boston police department to 
make a written record of any incident involving a police officer.164  The officer 
is asked to describe the nature of the incident in the report.165  However, when a 
police officer provides information in the incident report, he should not provide 
false information.166  The Commonwealth said the incident report was false 
because it wrongly suggested that proper authorization was given to tow the 
car.167  Boston police Captain Mary Evans’s testimony strongly suggested a 
reasonable police officer in the position of the defendant police officer should 
know that information in the report was not correct and false.168
The Massachusetts Court concluded that Evans’ testimony did not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant recognized that his report was 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id.
 160. See discussion supra Part III (discussing how Sergeant Crowley falsely related in 
the police report that the suspected intruders were black).
 161. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12, 12–13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) 
(stating that an officer or employee of the Commonwealth can be subject to punishment for 
filing a false police report under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 268, § 6A). 
 162. Id. at 747. 
 163. Id.
 164. Id.
 165. See id. (stating that inquiry number four of the incident report requires the "type of 
incident" being reported). 
 166. See id. at 747–48 (discussing that Massachusetts General Laws ch. 268, § 6A 
forbids an officer from providing false information in a police report). 
 167. See id. at 749 (stating the Commonwealth’s position that by stating that the officer 
towed the car which he had "recovered," there was a suggestion that authorization had taken 
place). 
 168. See id. (discussing the testimony of Captain Mary Evans and her usage of the term 
"recovered"). 
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false on a material fact.169  The Commonwealth made the case that the 
declaration was material since the "effect of the report was to cover up a crime 
committed by Roslindale Motors in towing the car without authorization and to 
allow the company to bill the motor vehicle’s owner for its services."170  Under 
these circumstances, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals concluded the 
evidence does not allow a reasonable inference that the defendant knew his 
statement was false regarding a material matter.171
The Massachusetts Constitution provides for the equality of all of its 
inhabitants by declaring racial discrimination illegal. 172  Under 
Massachusetts’s law, race profiling is defined as "the practice of detaining [or 
stopping] a suspect based on a broad set of criteria which casts suspicion on an 
entire class of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular 
person being stopped."173  Under the Massachusetts Constitution everyone is 
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.174  An alleged false 
statement regarding the race of the suspect, as reported in the police incident 
report prepared by Sergeant Crowley, is a plausible material fact and should 
expose him to a criminal  investigation under the rationale of Commonwealth v. 
Kelley.175  If there is any evidence that the incident report was employed with 
the goal of implementing unauthorized racial profiling, then Sergeant 
Crowley’s false statement regarding race in the incident report is false on a 
material matter.176  From a hypothetical perspective, even if Sergeant Crowley 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See id. (stating that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant 
knew his statement was false in a material matter). 
 170. Id. at 750. 
 171. See id. (discussing the lack of evidence showing that the defendant knew his 
statement was materially false).  The Court continued: 
Because the evidence does not provide sufficient basis for a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his statement was false and that he 
knew it to be false in a material matter, his motion for a required finding of not 
guilty should have been allowed.  Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is 
reversed, the finding is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court 
for entry of a judgment of acquittal.  Id.
 172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1 (West 2010) (stating that no one 
shall be denied equality under the law on the basis of race). 
 173. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, n.1 (Mass. 2008). 
 174. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14 (West 2010) (stating that every 
person has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 175. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding 
that there was not sufficient evidence that the police officer knew using the word 
"recovered" in the police report was false in a material matter). 
 176. See id. (stating that there needs to be evidence to provide a sufficient basis for a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew his statement was false). 
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engaged in race profiling under the circumstances involving Professor Gates, 
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals is likely to conclude that the evidence does 
not allow a reasonable inference that Sergeant Crowley knew his statement was 
false regarding a material matter.177  If Sergeant Crowley possessed a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity178 by Professor Gates during his initial 
encounter with Professor Gates, one could argue that he did not engage in race 
profiling.  Furthermore, any misrepresentation regarding Mrs. Whalen 
providing the racial identity of a potential suspect in the incident report is not 
likely to be considered as a material fact on the issue of race profiling.179  In a 
civil rights action filed by white students against Dartmouth College alleging 
their suspension was racially motivated,180 the federal court of appeals held, 
"merely juxtaposing the fact of one’s race with an instance of discrimination is 
insufficient to state a claim"181 of racial discrimination.  Similarly, simply 
juxtaposing race with an alleged false statement regarding the racial identity of 
a suspect in a police incident report by Sergeant Crowley may be considered as 
insufficient to prove that Sergeant Crowley committed a crime by making a 
false statement regarding a material fact in order to cover up the illegal act of 
racial profiling.182
Raymond Scott sued defendants after his arrest for disorderly conduct on 
a theory of racial profiling after the credit card company was wrongly informed 
that that plaintiff was suspected of engaging in stolen credit card use.183
Assuming that race was the dominant factor in why Scott was a target at the 
Plaza shopping mall, he faces an uphill battle in proving that the race profiling 
was illegal184 because the discriminatory intent proof requirement benefits the 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See id. at 751 (finding that there needs to be enough evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the police officer knew his statement was false). 
 178. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 37 (1968) (noting that while the police officer did 
not have probable cause to arrest, he had reasonable suspicion to stop, accost the defendant, 
and question him). 
 179. See Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12 at 15 (stating that an officer must know that a statement 
was false as to a material fact). 
 180. See Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(describing the complaint as stating that the President refused to meet with white students 
but met with an opposing group of black students). 
 181. See id. at 19 (stating that a "fact-specific allegation of a causal link between 
defendants’ conduct and plaintiffs’ race" is necessary for a count to stand). 
 182. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 626 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) 
(establishing the need for strong evidence of an officer’s knowledge of a false material fact).  
 183. See Scott v. Macy’s East, Inc., No. Civ.A.01-10323-NG, 2002 WL 31439745, at 
*1–2 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2002) (stating that mall officials identified the defendant as a stolen 
credit card suspect because of his behavior in a department store). 
 184. See id. at *7 (stating that the law requires a measure of proof and the claimant bears the 
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defendant regardless of the race of the alleged victim.185  In a complaint 
alleging that Sergeant Crowley falsely stated that Mrs. Whalen identified the 
suspects as black, Professor Gates nevertheless faces an uphill battle because of 
the heavy burden of proof generally placed on individuals alleging selective 
law enforcement based on racial profiling.186
VI.  Conclusion 
The arrest of Professor Gates by Sergeant Crowley teaches us that 
racial profiling in the criminal justice system remains a hot button issue.187
African Americans are the primary targets of racial profiling in America.188
Because of their race profiling experience, it should not be surprising that 
African Americans are more likely to accept a charge of racial profiling 
from a black Harvard professor than many of their white friends.189  On the 
other hand, most white Americans who have not experienced racial 
profiling are more likely to accept a white police sergeant’s allegation that 
he arrested the Harvard professor because he engaged in disorderly conduct 
and not because of his race. 
The lesson from the narrative involving Professor Gates and Sergeant 
Crowley may be that on the issue of race profiling, many blacks and many 
whites probably identify with a different worldview.190  In order to close the 
racial divide on the issue of racial profiling, it is necessary to provide 
sensitive training to all Americans.  The racial profiling sensitive training 
should include a joint presentation from the perspective of the traditional 
victims of race targeting and police officers charged with enforcing our 
                                                                                                                 
burden of proof). 
 185. See id. at *6–7 (stating that the claimant bears the burden of production and proof and the 
defaults favor the defendant). 
 186. See Melissa Whitney, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops and 
Searches:  Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263, 282–
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due to the unavailability of data in specific circumstances). 
 187. See discussion supra Part II (discussing racial profiling in general); see also Kalson, supra 
note 11, at A1 (discussing the importance for President Obama to address racial profiling in this 
specific instance). 
 188. See Hendrix, supra note 33, at 3 (stating that African Americans have been the primary 
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 190. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the "subjective Black experience" as a result of 
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laws fairly and impartially.  This joint race sensitive training could be 
conducted before churches, religious groups, community organizations, 
civic organizations, and business groups.  The incident involving Professor 
Gates and Sergeant Crowley shows that every person living in America 
should be given an opportunity to receive sensitivity training as a proactive 
measure to help us all learn how to get along.  Finally, race profiling 
sensitive training should be offered to all people living in America so that 
we may learn how to avoid the default stereotyping of people from other 
racial or ethnic groups.  Default stereotyping occurs when the negative 
preconceived notions that an individual brings to the table when interacting 
with an individual from a specific racial or ethnic group is a predominant 
factor in analyzing a given situation.  Default stereotyping is dangerous 
because it can cloud our judgment and lead to racial profiling. 
